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These entrepreneurial policies are expected to generate economic activity and employment; however, empirical studies have suggested that, although they do renovate the urban landscape and give an impression of economic regeneration, they have failed to redress the employment, social and fiscal situations of cities (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998) . Thus, it has been argued that the use of prestige mega-projects is not a solution for economic regeneration for many reasons. First, it does not produce a rise in economic activity (Imrie and Thomas, 1999) . Second, its alleged role in encouraging private sector development or investment has not proved to be true (Cochrane, 1999) .
Third, construction activity does not necessarily imply more local employment and the employment that is generated is insecure and low-wage, unskilled work (Turok, 1992) .
Moreover, the promised trickle-down generated by mega-projects -in substitution for investment in welfare -has proved to be absent or very limited (Cochrane, 1999; Imrie and Thomas, 1999) .
Even when entrepreneurial strategies based on mega-projects do succeed in attracting investment, they have proved to exacerbate distributive inequalities of wealth and income (Hubbard and Hall, 1998) . On the one hand, concentration on image diverts attention from economic and social problems. On the other hand, since the viability of urban mega-projects depends on the returns from land revalorisation, they tend to displace the population because of gentrification processes (Evans, 2005) . Thus, property markets contribute to the creation of fragmented urban landscapes and Amparo Tarazona Vento 5 accentuate socio-spatial polarisation and exclusion processes (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) .
In addition, the benefits of the revalorisation of the land and the built environment are almost exclusively reaped by the elite. Given the speculative nature of the investment, there is financial risk involved, and this is carried by the public sector since prestige mega-projects are almost always state-led and state financed (ibid). Thus, the state's engagement in the development of costly iconic architecture and the hosting of international events has resulted in a net transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector through the built environment (Harvey, 1989) .
Mega-projects as conduits of neoliberal governance
Urban mega-projects - Moulaert et al. (2005) have argued -are conduits of globalisation; considered at a structural level, processes of globalisation entail the transfer of global elements of neoliberalism as entrepreneurial urban policies spread. As explained by Keil (2002:239) , 'the concrete implementation of new technologies of power has played a key role in these processes of neoliberalization'. Therefore, megaprojects can also be considered conduits of neoliberalisation or, more specifically, drivers of change leading to more neoliberal forms of governance, which involve an approach to governance that is based on public-private partnership, authoritarianism and a lack of democratic accountability (Keil, 2002; Jessop 2002) .
Amparo Tarazona Vento 6 An approach to governance that entails the mobilisation of key private actors -through business elite leadership but more often through public-private partnerships -is defended, from a neoliberal perspective, on the grounds that it is allegedly more technically efficient, flexible, collaborative and participative (Jessop, 1997) . Thus, the practice of partnership has become the preferred organisational model, and semi-public organisations for the delivery of urban mega-projects have proliferated .
The growth of partnerships can be considered an instance of the broader move towards a more flexible, less hierarchical and stakeholder-based style of decision-making . Although this approach is often portrayed as more bottom-up and participatory, in practice only a limited group of professionals and members of the elite -architects, planners, developers, financiers and business leaders -are allowed to take part in decision-making. The input of the general public is restricted and postponed to very advanced stages of the process when the important decisions have already been made, given that the main responsibility lies with the 'experts' (ibid). In this way, certain groups are excluded from the decision-making process, while the interests of the city are identified with those of members of the business elites and privileged social groups.
The need to create networks of collaboration between elite groups and the public sector in order to achieve the necessary stability to compete for state and private investment Amparo Tarazona Vento 7 has led these partnerships to restrict access to information and data in order to prevent external actors from destabilising the cohesion of the networks (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) . Thus, democratic debate about the costs and benefits of the mega-projects is generally avoided and information about the real financial costs is not made available to the public . Furthermore, the transfer of public funds into private hands occurs in an obscure way, 'and since relatively few people are directly injured, it is difficult to mobilize opposition' (Orueta and Fainstein, 2008:761) .
This shift towards quasi-private management structures and the consequent partial loss of public control over the decision-making and development processes has been described as a privatisation of governance and planning, since the new delivery bodies displace governmental and planning institutions (Imrie and Thomas, 1999) . This privatisation entails the redistribution of power and competencies away from elected local governments and towards the private sector via subordinating the local authorities to such quasi-private bodies and redefining their role to make them become mere strategic enablers of the regeneration process (ibid). The privatisation of planning is enhanced by the widespread practice of applying exceptionality measures to the design and implementation of mega-projects, which is justified on the grounds of their scale and their significance for the whole of the city, and the need for greater technical efficiency and shorter delivery times (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) .
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Depoliticisation through mega-projects
Beyond leading to more autocratic and privatised forms of decision-making, looking through the lens of the growing literature on post-politics and post-democracy -which point to the emergence of a consensus democracy in which the status quo is not fundamentally questioned (Swyngedouw, 2011) -the mechanisms used to implement mega-projects can be seen to be intimately linked to processes of depoliticisation.
As previously discussed, mega-projects can be considered conduits for neoliberal modes of governance and, from a governmentality point of view, post-democracy, just like neoliberalism, is characterised by a technocratic and privatised management of the public sphere (Swyngedouw, 2010) . However, neoliberalism is more than 'a diffuse regime of political-economic power' or 'a very loose bundle of political practices and governmentalities' (Leitner et al., 2007:316-317) . It entails the extension of market values to all spheres of life, including the psychological sense of self. As Kamat (2015) has argued, the literature of post-politics can help understand the ideological implications of neoliberalisation.
Considering that the post-political represents -institutionally -'the reduction of the political to the economic' and -ideologically -'the end of utopia' (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015:8) , which entails the incapacity to imagine an alternative to neoliberal capitalism, it is obvious how fundamentally related processes of 9 neoliberalisation and depoliticisation are. According to Kamat, depoliticisation is central to the maintenance and advance of neoliberalism or, in her words, to 'institut(ing) a political culture that is indispensable to the neoliberal growth strategy' (Kamat, 2015:67-68) . Certainly, a consensual democracy is crucial to support the neoliberal project both ideologically and psychologically.
In that respect, by signifying the city's commitment to creating a 'welcoming business environment', prestige mega-projects do symbolise 'the reduction of the political to the economic' (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015:8) . Moreover, iconic architecture, through its capacity of seduction, contributes to mentally blocking the possibility of alternative policies for entrepreneurial urban regeneration.
The conceptual core of post-politics is represented by the distinction between politicsas the practices that create social order by trying to 'ground a particular set of power relations on an ultimately absent foundation' -and the political -as the evidence of the absence of an ultimate ground of society, which leaves open the possibility of creating a different social order (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015:10) . Post-democracy or postpolitics operate, according to Rancière, through different forms of disavowal (archipolitics, para-politics and meta-politics) which conceal the absence of an ultimate ground of society or, according to Žižek, through foreclosure, the denegation such absence.
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Archi-politics is a tactic of depoliticisation that is based on the idea of a community that lives in harmony. Para-politics is based on the idea of the reduction of antagonism to superficial competition within an established order, while meta-politics is based on the conception that all forms of societal inequalities derive from an essential one (economic, for instance). To these three Žižek adds ultra-politics, which is based on the construction of an enemy with which disagreement can only be managed in terms of violence.
Also from this perspective, mega-projects can say something about how, empirically, the political is disavowed. If, as Rancière and Mouffe do, the emphasis is put on postpolitics or post-democracy 'as an ideal of consensus, inclusion and administration' (Dean, 2015:264) , mega-projects have proved to be useful tools to generate consensus and displace debate to issues of purely technocratic administration. The archi-political tactic of presenting policies based on mega-projects as policies with no winners or losers is supported by a physical reality -iconic architecture -that signifies the image of economic growth and regeneration which is being presented to the public. If, as Žižek does, the emphasis is put on 'post-politics as the foreclosure of class struggle' (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015:14-15) , the populist discourse often linked to mega-projects goes beyond creating consensus; it homogenises society and sublimates class conflicts into other types of difference. Actually, in addition to the openly discussed goal of achieving economic regeneration, the unmentioned but clearly important goal of iconic mega-projects is to convince citizens of the virtues of competitive strategies (Hubbard, 1996) , creating the illusion of a harmonious, united and homogeneous community which competes globally for tourism and prestige.
On the other hand, since society is inevitably instituted on an absent ground leaving any social order open to disruption, post-politicisation is a necessarily incomplete process.
Moreover, rather than bringing about 'the return of the genuinely political', politics can only twist the established order (Van Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck, 2015:103) .The empirical focus turns, then, to understanding better through which mechanisms and practices the post-political order is constituted, but also how it can be challenged and disrupted. As some authors have argued, this includes everyday practices and the 'micro-politics of resistance' (Mitchell et al., 2014; Larner, 2015) . However, it is also worth exploring how effectively any specific form of re-politicisation can contribute to undermining the established social order and to establishing a different one.
The meltdown of Valencia's mega-projects
Valencia -the third biggest city in Spain -is ideal to analyse the outcomes of a policy based on mega-projects and events because, in Valencia, it became almost the only policy and was pursued over time by both conservative and social-democratic regional and local governments. In addition, Valencia's urban policy contributed to the promotion of a regional economy based on tourism and construction. In 1994, the construction sector contributed 7.4% to the regional GDP, 10% in 2000 and, in 2009, after the property bubble burst, the construction sector contributed 11% of the regional GDP and 14.8% of the total regional employment (Boira, 2012) . The conservative regional president, Camps, in his public speeches, described projects such as The City of Sciences and the America's Cup as 'tourism factories of the 21st century ' (Pérez, 2007) and insisted that the construction sector had 'to continue being the main driving force of the economy, job creation and Amparo Tarazona Vento   18 welfare' (Ferrandis, 2009a ). This economic model generated low-wage, precarious jobs.
In fact, between 2002 and 2010, the average annual salary in construction, commerce, the hospitality sector and businesses services was between 30% and 40% lower than the Spanish average (Instituto Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es). Also, the regional temporary employment rate in Valencia in 2008 was 32.3%, whereas the Spanish average was 29.3% (Cámara Comercio Valencia, 2010) .
In addition, the emphasis on mega-projects and events drained funds from health, and 2007, a period of economic growth, income distribution showed no improvement in terms of equality, while the percentage of relative poverty increased from 13.3% to 15.2% (Azagra and Romero, 2012) . In 2010, the economic crisis had brought inequality and poverty to levels higher than those present in the early 1980s (ibid).
The investment in mega-projects also left the regional government highly indebted. As CACSA and others − and the bank guarantees given to them (Ferrandis, 2008) . With the economic downturn, the problem of indebtedness and the difficulties of maintaining the mega-projects built during the economic boom were made more evident, and in 2013 the Valencian regional government was the first one to ask for a bailout from central government.
While the state carried the financial risks and remained bankrupt, the construction and property sectors reaped the bulk of the economic benefits generated by mega-projects and events, as the economic impact reports of both The City of Sciences and the America's Cup commissioned by the regional government suggest. Therefore, instead of there being a net transfer of wealth to society as a whole, in reality there was a transfer of public money into private hands.
Neoliberal urban regeneration in Valencia
Beyond the image and the physical, social and economic outcomes, there are less visible consequences of Valencia's urban policy, which brought about profound governance changes.
In fact, the mechanisms used to implement mega-projects and events played an important role in managing the city 'on a seat-of-the-pants basis in the interests of the favoured few and their vested interests', as described by a local ecologist group (Zafra, 2004) . First, for the majority of them, exceptionality measures were applied using the justification of efficiency, the speeding-up of procedures and the social interest of the projects. The second main mechanism that was used to take decision-making out of the Moreover, in 2001, with the excuse of creating a more efficient management and making it easier to set up contractual relations (Olivares, 2001) , CACSA was divided into four limited companies, the directors of which do not have to answer to a governing body or a shareholders' board. In addition, the quantity of information they must make public was further reduced.
Similarly, referring to VEPI − a foundation created with 50% local and 50% regional public capital to promote Valencia's tourism on the occasion of the America's Cup − a socialist party city councillor complains that Amparo Tarazona Vento   25 an instrumental company has been set up that is unaccountable to anyone from the opposition or the public at large who might like to know what is being done with public money. No account is rendered of the reports and it has been used for contracting companies or hiring personnel at will, even in the current crisis, to organise the event. (Interview with city councillor, 3 November 2009) Ultimately, the exceptionality measures and the privatisation of management − through the creation of semi-public foundations and public corporations − resulted in a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic control, which often led to corruption.
The decline of democracy in Valencia
In addition to being conduits of neoliberal modes of governance, Valencia's megaprojects are intimately linked to the establishment of a 'consensual autocratic postpolitical post-democracy' (Swyngedouw, 2011) .
Certainly, mega-projects and events were managed by making use of a myriad of semistatal bodies of the likes of CACSA and VEPI. The stress was clearly on efficient management rather than on having an ideological programme, as the words of CACSA's business director illustrate:
Amparo Tarazona Privatised and technocratic governance was accompanied by a populist politics and discourse, which caused the intensification of depoliticisation. The conservative regional and local governments − using an archi-political tactic of depoliticisation − insisted that mega-projects and events were good for the Valencian people as a whole.
By taking 'the Valencian people' as the universal political subject, internal ideological and social conflicts were denied and therefore democratic political action became a question of deciding who was the best manager and administrator of the public purse and the 'common' interest of the Valencians. This populism was reflected in the press, which was one of the main instruments to gain popular consent, as a local journalist of But if The City of Sciences is, according to Calatrava, representative of Valencia's democracy, it also became a metaphor for the state of democracy. In 2013, seven years after the building was inaugurated, a section of the 8,000-metre-square mosaic which covered the outer skin of the opera palace fell off, the rest had to be stripped off to avoid further deterioration and performances were cancelled (Europa Press, 2014).
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Conclusions
The most evident results of Valencia's urban policy, besides the physical transformation, were social inequality, underinvestment in social services and fiscal crisis, in short, a net transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector through the built environment.
But, beyond the disastrous social and economic outcomes, the mechanisms used to implement mega-projects led to the institution of more authoritative and privatised forms of decision-making, which resulted in a lack of transparency, lack of democratic control and, ultimately, corruption. Indeed, mega-projects are conduits of neoliberalisation and, therefore, the literature of neoliberalism as a mode of governance is useful to explore the implications of entrepreneurial urban regeneration policies for democratic decision-making.
Moreover, mega-projects played a crucial role in the establishment of a consensual postdemocracy by turning the focus from ideological struggle to technocracy and by being the centre of a populist discourse that foreclosed ideological debate.
Bearing witness to how inevitably linked neoliberalisation and depoliticisation are, the case of Valencia shows not only how fundamental a consensual democracy is to support the neoliberal project both ideologically and psychologically but also the central role The consensus generated by mega-projects rested to great extent on the power of seduction and symbolism of iconic architecture. Mega-projects became the representation of feelings of local pride and identity, distracting in this way attention from social antagonism and contributing to mentally blocking the possibility of alternatives for entrepreneurialism.
The implication this has for political agendas is that if symbolic representation is important for the construction of the post-political and for supporting neoliberalism it can also be a useful tool for contesting them, as the case of Valencia also suggests.
The 2008 economic crisis stimulated, in Spain, the appearance of new social movements, which nurtured a process of incipient re-politicisation. In Valencia, as austerity measures intensified and the regional government's bankruptcy was more evident, the voices criticising the urban policy, which by 2011 had been put in the limelight by the press and Indignados movement as the visible cause of the region's economic problems and deteriorated democracy, started to become louder and more numerous, and, finally, had electoral consequences.
In 2015 On the one hand, in contrast with the elitist and authoritarian decision-making of which mega-projects were both conduits and symbol, the Indignados movement -translated electorally in València en Comú -provided the symbolism of being-in-common and of participatory decision-making. The deliberations in the occupied squares -besides an opportunity for many of hearing an account of mega-projects different to the official one and to imagine a different Valencia -became the symbolic representation of a new way of doing politics.
Amparo Tarazona Vento   33 On the other hand, the same mega-projects that symbolised 'the reduction of the political to the economic' (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015:8) 
